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Abstract: Craft-education was an important pedagogical model in the ancient world, but its 
importance was obscured by the common contrast between rhetoric and philosophy. 
Christian writers such as Gregory of Nyssa used craft-education as a model for Christian 
formation, because of its powerful emphasis on commitment, time, effort and the 
willingness of both pupil and teacher to submit to change. In the latter part of my article I 
will offer a preliminary assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of craft-education as a 
model for the process of Christian formation.   
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a. Introduction 
 In this article I argue that craft-education was an important pedagogical model in the 
ancient world, but one which was obscured by the common contrast between rhetoric and 
philosophy. Taking my inspiration from that fact that early Christian writers used craft-
education as a model for Christian formation, in the latter part of my article I will offer a 
preliminary assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. In the course of 
my argument, I will rely on some background assumptions, which I take to be fairly universal 
among Christian theologians of the first five centuries. First, there was no essential 
difference between what one might call theology, systematic theology or doctrine and, on 
the other, practical theology or Christian ethics. Practical advice on how to act was based on 
more fundamental theological principles; conversely, early Christians saw mistakes about 
dogma as much in terms of moral as intellectual error. The present-day distinction between 
systematic and practical theology is largely due to the modern organisation of theology into 
sub-disciplines. Secondly, for most early Christian theologians ‘ethics’ meant a theory of 
virtue. This was usually broadly Aristotelian in its assumptions about habit and the mean, 
although one also frequently finds Stoic influence. Finally, ancient discussions of education 
almost universally assume that teaching has an ethical dimension. Consequently, my 
argument is not only about the teaching of ethics (as an essential part of Christian 
formation), but it is also, and more fundamentally, about the ethics of teaching. 
 
b. Lecture vs conversation (rhetoric vs philosophy) 
 It is easy to assume that just two models of education are under debate in classical 
texts: one based on the giving/receiving of extended discourse (usually a speech, but also a 
written text) and the other on conversational exchange. These models were commonly 
associated by the ancients with rhetoric and philosophy respectively and today it is 
tempting to equate them with the modern university lecture (and other kinds of passive 
learning) on the one hand, and more conversational and active forms of learning and 
teaching on the other.  
 Plato’s dialogues collectively provide a classic example of the discussion of ancient 
models of education. Socrates, as interpreted by Plato, appears to debunk the idea that 
teaching is simply the transfer of raw information from one person to another. Rather, he 
advocates a method of teaching by which pupils discover the truth for themselves under 
guidance from their teacher. In the Theaetetus this model of learning is expressed through 
the metaphor of a midwife. Knowledge must be brought to birth by the pupil. The 
philosophical midwife has the experience to guide, comfort, offer practical support and 
alleviate pain; she cannot give birth to the baby herself.2  
 Essential to this model is the concept of dialectic, that is, a form of reasoned 
discourse structured as a conversation or as question and answer. Rather than being on the 
receiving end of a lecture, the pupil can answer back. Like the midwife who is responsive to 
the needs of her particular patient, the philosopher—the midwife of the soul—is responsive 
to each specific pupil.3 This sets conversational exchange above extended discourse as a 
mediator of the truth. Consequently, in the Phaedrus (which sets out the parameters of 
good discourse), Socrates pronounces that written texts are not bad in themselves, but can 
only serve as a useful reminder of the truth for those who have already learnt from 
 
2 Plato, Theaetetus, 148e-151d.  
3 On the importance of knowing one’s particular pupil: Plato, Phaedrus, 271d. 
engagement with ‘living breathing discourse of the man who knows’.4 Dialectic—
conversation—is the form of speech which allows that kind of deep engagement.5  
 Many other classical authors rehearse this dichotomy between two forms of 
teaching: on the one hand, a teacher’s attempt to convey and control knowledge through a 
lecture or a written text and, on the other, a deeply-personal, conversational and mutual 
interaction between a teacher and his pupil. This dichotomy was shored up by the classic 
rivalry between rhetoric and philosophy.6 The orator produced public speeches or lectures 
which facilitated widespread communication for the common good (especially in a 
democracy), but which were compromised by the audience’s inability to question or answer 
back and by the orator’s use of emotion and other persuasive techniques. The philosopher, 
on the other hand, engaged his pupil in one-to-one rational conversation resolutely 
focussed on the truth, a method which allowed for critical engagement, but which was not 
well-suited to promoting debate across a whole community. Consequently, philosophers 
were accused of keeping the truth to themselves.7 
 However, the way in which Plato contrasts the pedagogic value of continuous 
discourse with dialectic is deeply problematic. First, Socrates’ account of good speech in the 
 
4 Plato, Phaedrus 271d. 
5 Plato, Phaedrus 276d-277a. 
6 e.g. S. Halliwell, ‘Philosophy and Rhetoric’ in Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action I. Worthington (ed) 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1994), pp.222–43 and B. Vickers, ‘Territorial Disputes: Philosophy vs 
Rhetoric’. in ibid. In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1988). 
7 Themistius (317–c. 390 AD) articulates both sides of the argument in order to argue that philosophy and 
rhetoric needed each other: Themistius Oration 26, trans. R. Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius 
(Berkeley: University of California, 2000), pp. 140–163. 
Phaedrus is not a good a description of what either Socrates or Plato actually do. At best 
Socrates’ practice of dialectic allows for a process of step-by-step critique of common 
assumptions which leads to the discovery of the truth; at worst it is a deeply manipulative 
process by which he leads his hapless conversation-partners through a process of relentless 
question and answer to a reductio ad absurdum. Plato is the author of a long series of 
written texts, many of which combine dialectic with long narrative speeches (—see 
especially the Republic). Secondly, historians argue that the rhetoric-philosophy contrast is 
itself a rhetorical trope, used both by philosophers and teachers of rhetoric to establish 
their superiority as a profession and win pupils in a competitive market.8 Thirdly, and most 
crucially for the argument of this paper, the dichotomy obscures a third, extremely 
widespread understanding of education in the ancient world—that is, education as craft-
apprenticeship. 
 
c. Learning a craft 
 The classical Greek word technē is notoriously difficult to translate: it can, according 
to context, be translated as art, craft, skill, or technique.9 Its usual range of meaning is 
positive to neutral, but it can sometimes be employed pejoratively to mean cunning or 
tricksiness. In other words, it is a term with a broad application. Nevertheless, it also has a 
 
8 e.g. J. Hesk, Jon. ‘The Rhetoric of Anti-Rhetoric in Athenian Oratory’ in Performance Culture and Athenian 
Democracy S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.201–30. 
9 Anne Balansard, Technè dans les Dialogues de Platon : l’empreinte de la sophistique (Sankt Augustin : 
Academia, 2001), 16–17. 
very specific core meaning in both classical and Christian sources—one which embeds the 
notion of education as formation.  
In essence, technē is defined by four things:10 
• First, each technē relates to a field of knowledge which range from the very specific and 
well-defined (like knowledge of the principles of geometry or knowing how to play the 
clarinet) to the very broad, like medical knowledge. 
• Secondly, a technē is learned by imitating a particular teacher, rather than by 
memorising certain facts.11 In other words, the concept of technē is inseparable from 
human relationship, specifically a kind of apprenticeship, usually undertaken alongside 
other apprentices.12 The ancient writers are emphatic that this kind of learning involves 
time, effort and life-changing commitment: it is, in the fullest sense, a discipline. 
• Thirdly, technē is almost universally assumed to bring about something which is, 
broadly speaking, good for society.13 Medicine is regarded as an archetypal technē: 
 
10 The following definition is my own, based on my reading of Balansard, Techné; Jörg Kube, TEXNH UND 
APETH; sophistisches und platonisches Tugendwissen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969). and especially David Roochnik, 
Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Techne (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1996), especially 20 and 26. For a more detailed discussion see Morwenna Ludlow, Art, Craft and Theology in 
Fourth Century Christian Authors, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), chap. 
1. 
11 See, e.g. Frances Margaret Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), 257.: ‘Mimēsis lay at the heart of apprenticeship, whether in skills leading to a 
trade or a profession, or in those virtues which shaped a moral and spiritual life’:, p. 257. 
12 For the notion of the workshop as a learning space, see Ludlow, Art, Craft and Theology, Chapter 10. 
13 Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom, 20, 26. 
although it is recognised that a physician could use his skills to cause disease as well as 
healing, there seems to be a root assumption that he ought not to.14 
• Fourthly, technē has a range of outcomes: some craftspeople create products like boats, 
houses or pots; others bring about a particular state-of-affairs like health. For others, the 
craft activity is the product itself, so for example, the craft of playing the clarinet simply 
leads to clarinet-playing.15  
 There is a common assumption in modern scholarship that technē properly only 
applies to practices which lead to separable products (boats, houses or pots). It is true that 
Aristotle tends to define technē in this way and that he subordinates practices which lead to 
separable products to practices which bring about certain states-of-affairs (like medicine) 
and especially to practices which are ends in themselves, notably contemplation or 
theoria.16 However, this was not the only ancient perspective. An alternative view-point is 
found in Basil of Caesarea’s Sermons on the Six Days of Creation (Hexameron):  
 
14 One could conclude from the broad literature on the misuse of technē theme that all technē is value-neutral 
(it is how it is used that makes the difference): see, for example, Roochnik on Aristotle (Roochnik, 31.) and 
Sennett on Hannah Arendt (Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 1–5.). However, I 
suggest that the ‘problem’ of the bad use of technē logically assumes the prior assumption that technē ought 
to result in a useful and good outcome.  
15 It is true that some philosophers associate a technē with a separable product; but on the whole, the 
Christian authors dealt with here accept this broader concept, for reasons which will become obvious. 
16 This tidy definition helps Aristotle solve the knotty problem of whether philosophy is a technē or not. 
Aristotle, Nichomachaean Ethics I.1 (1094a; 1140a). Balansard, Techné, pp. 5-12; cf Roochnik, Of Art and 
Wisdom, pp. 1-14. 
Among arts (technai), some have in view production (poiētikai), some 
practice (praktikai), others theory (theōrētikai). The object of the last is the 
exercise of thought, that of the second, the motion of the body. Should it 
cease, all stops; nothing more is to be seen. Thus, dancing and music leave 
nothing behind; they have no object but themselves. In creative arts on the 
contrary the work lasts after the operation. Such is architecture—such are 
the arts which work in wood and brass and weaving, all those indeed which, 
even when the artisan (the technitēs) has disappeared, serve to show an 
industrious (technikos) intelligence and to cause the architect, the worker in 
brass or the weaver, to be admired on account of his work.17 
Here Basil certainly does not disparage crafts which lead to a product, because his whole 
point in the immediate context of this passage is to point to the beauties of the natural 
world in order to praise the skill and goodness of their creator, God, whom Basil like other 
early fathers frequently refers to as a craftsperson or artisan (technitēs). I have shown 
elsewhere that this is a common perspective on technē.18 Although it is true that 
intellectuals like Aristotle and Cicero disparaged craftmanship compared to the liberal arts 
such as rhetoric and philosophy, this was a very one-sided viewpoint.19 Material evidence 
 
17 Basil, Hexameron I.7 (NPNF). 
18 Ludlow, Art, Craft and Theology. 
19 Cicero De officiis I.150-1. The idea that the ancients disparaged craftsmanship is based on selective reading 
which prioritises writers such as Aristotle and Cicero; Balansard argues it was encouraged by Marxist 
historiography ( Balansard, Technè, 6–7.). 
such as grave-markers, for example, shows that artisans had a strong and confident pride in 
their profession and its value to society.20 
 The concept which is central to technē is not the application of techniques to create 
a separable product, but rather the notions of knowledge and learning. In this, the ancient 
concept of technē resonates strikingly with the school of modern writing which, from Morris 
and Ruskin onwards, has aimed to re-establish a broad continuum of kinds of human 
making.21 They acknowledge that a craft can give rise to a product, or a new state-of-affairs, 
or can consist in an activity itself.22 They emphasise the fact that a craft can include both 
highly material practices, like carpentry, and intensely intellectual ones, like computer-
programming.23 Over against this broad scope of activities which can be labelled ‘crafts’ one 
can find a fairly consistent emphasis on certain key principles. Uniting the ideas of 
knowledge and apprenticeship, modern craft theorists are particularly interested in the idea 
that craft involves ‘tacit knowledge’ – that is, knowledge in a particular field which is 
acquired by learning from the example of an expert or experts.24 This is usually assumed to 
include some kind of personal contact, even if it is, as with Richard Sennett’s computer 
 
20 e.g. Peter Stewart, The Social History of Roman Art (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 18–28. 
21 Some working with ‘art’ others with ‘craft’ as an umbrella term. 
22 See e.g. David Jones, ‘Art and Sacrament’, in Epoch and Artist: Selected Writings, ed. Harman Grisewood 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 153. ‘the whole field of human making: boot-making, English prose, radar, 
horticulture, carpentry’; further examples include the activities of bowling a beautiful ball in cricket and liturgy. 
23 For these and many other examples see Sennett, The Craftsman. 
24 Sennett, 50–60; Christopher Frayling, On Craftsmanship: Towards a New Bauhaus (London: Oberon Books, 
2011), 40–46 and 69–74; Glenn Adamson, Thinking through Craft (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2007), 78–81.  
programmers, one pupil learning from an online master on the other side of the world.25  
Like ancient writers they frequently emphasise the time and effort required. 
 
d. Learning and teaching as formation 
Craft-education, then, is key to the concept of ancient technē and modern craft. The 
ancients were united in the belief that a true technē could not be learned easily. Pupils had 
to learn by example from their teachers: watching them, listening to them and copying 
them. Expertise was gained from multiple repetitions: thus, a young man learning rhetoric 
would be made to compose many speeches on a certain kind of theme, before he was 
regarded as expert.26 
Early Christian writers frequently use the craft model of a pupil learning a practice 
through imitation and repetition. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, describes ascetic formation 
in this way: 
There are indeed written instructions teaching these things [which are 
necessary for a truly Christian life], but clearer than verbal instruction is 
guidance by example. It’s not at all annoying for those who undertake a long 
 
25 Sennett, The Craftsman, 24–27. 
26 An example of this kind can be found in Augustine, Confessions I xvii (27). Note the distinction between rote 
learning and learning by repeated practice. The former involved learning certain phrases or texts by heart and 
then repeating them word for word. The kind of repetition involved in learning a technē, however, is focused 
on the mastery of a practice, which aimed at precision, accuracy and reliability but not identical repetition. A 
rhetor would practice funeral speeches so that he could reliably evoke the appropriate response in his 
audience; he would not say exactly the same thing every single time.  
journey or a substantial voyage to meet someone who guides them…  There 
is a workshop of the virtues, in which such an excellent life has been polished 
to the highest degree of precision. There is. . .  much opportunity there for 
being taught this heavenly way of life by example, since any theory divorced 
from practice, however beautifully refined it may be, is like a lifeless statue 
(eikōn), displaying its blooming features in tints and colours; but the man 
who does what he teaches (as the Gospel says somewhere)—he is a man 
who is truly alive and in the prime of beauty. . .27 
This passage suggests that one cannot learn to be a Christian from a book alone (not even 
the Bible). In Gregory’s other works he advises Christians to imitate Jesus Christ,28 but here 
he acknowledges that it is helpful if they also have other teachers from whom they can learn 
by example. It is clear from this passage that the process of learning requires time, and 
effort: it therefore demands commitment from both pupil and teacher. 
 However, this process is described not just in terms of learning by example but also 
as a process of formation—that is, people are changed by it. A Christian community should 
be ‘a workshop of the virtues’ in which the ‘excellent life has been polished to the highest 
degree of precision’. But the workshop is not just a place where practices are refined; 
rather, this Christian workshop of virtue produces people—the statues which are polished 
and coloured. In other words, the Christian workshop is in the business of forming—of 
shaping—Christians. 
 
27 Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity 23.1: My translation. 
28 See especially, On perfection (perf) and On the Christian Mode of Life (prof). 
 Gregory’s statue metaphor clearly alludes to the doctrine that humans were created 
in the divine image (Gen. 1:26-7: eikōn in Greek means both ‘image’ and ‘statue’). Gregory, 
like other early Christian writers, sometimes refer to creation as the process by which God 
the artist paints or sculpts God’s own image in humanity. Sin obscures or soils the image; 
salvation is the process by which Jesus Christ cleans the image up.29 Although divine grace is 
absolutely necessary (especially that given in baptism), human beings have a responsibility 
to tend to their divine image, not least so that it is a witness to others. The truly Christian 
life, therefore, can be understood as the collection of practices which, with God’s grace, 
refine God’s image in oneself and attend to God’s image in others. Christian formation is 
thus sometimes expressed as repainting the self. Gregory of Nyssa also expresses it as the 
sculpting of the self, adapting the Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus’s idea to a Christian 
theology of creation and salvation.30 In sum, the image of the statue implies that the 
Christian pupil is shaped by the process of formation—shaped simultaneously by one’s 
teacher and by one’s own engagement with the process. 
 The idea that one is shaped by learning a craft and specifically through learning by 
example and repetition is also a very common theme in modern writing on craft—Richard 
Sennett even compares the commitment to repeated practice to religious ritual.31 It often 
occurs in the claim that one needs to make 10,000 pots to be a potter—an idea which is 
 
29 Gregory of Nyssa, Making of Humankind V.1 and Beatitudes I.2; Athanasius, Incarnation 14; Macarian 
Homilies XXX.4; John Chrysostom, Catechetical Lectures II.3; Ephrem’s 28th Hymn on Virginity. 
30 Gregory of Nyssa, Inscriptions of the Psalms (trans. Heine) II.134. Cf Plotinus, Ennead I.6.9, quoting Plato, 
Phaedrus 252d and 254b. 
31 Sennett, The Craftsman, 177–78. 
difficult to pin down, but frequently credited to Bernard Leach.32 It finds concrete aesthetic 
expression in Edmund de Waal’s series of porcelain pots, nearly, but not quite the same, 
repeated sequences, carefully set in different locations. These repeated sequences, which 
crystallise in space the craftsman’s work in time, draw the viewer away from seeking in the 
work of art a doorway into the artist’s souls and instead draw her to focus not on the 
craftsman but on the process of making.33 The result of this repetition is that the 
practitioner continues not only to learn but continues to be shaped by his or her practice. It 
is no coincidence that people as diverse as Richard Sennett, Grayson Perry, and Edmund de 
Waal reach for quasi-religious language when they come to write about learning and to 
practicing a craft: commitment, ritual, spirituality, pilgrimage, for example.34 But it is also 
connected with the shaping or the formation of the individual. Learning a craft or a technical 
skill can be a vital entry point to the formational aspects of education for those people who 
are challenged by traditional kinds of school education, especially ones which can only be 
accessed through a particular kind of expertise in written or spoken words. There is also 
 
32 For Leach’s philosophy of craft see: Bernard Leach, A Potter’s Book (London: Faber and Faber, 2011).  Cf 
Bernard Leach, Beyond East and West: Memoirs, Portraits and Essays, [1st publd 1978] (London: Faber, 2012), 
143–44.: ‘We only turned out two to three thousand pots a year between the four of us [in their workshop in 
Cornwall], and of these not more than ten per cent passed muster for shows.’ 
33 See http://www.edmunddewaal.com/#; Edmund De Waal, ‘Comment - Edmund de Waal on Minimalism’, 
Crafts 169 (2001): 46–49. 
34 Sennett, The Craftsman, e.g. 177. Edmund De Waal, The White Road: A Pilgrimage of Sorts (London: Chatto 
& Windus, 2015). On Grayson Perry: Jacky Klein, Grayson Perry (London: Thames and Hudson, 2013), chap. 6. 
evidence for the ways in which craft skills can train the hand and train the attention, in ways 
which soothe and shape lives which are experienced as disordered.35 
However, both ancient and modern writers suggest that the teacher too is formed: 
the process of learning a craft by experience means that the practitioner of a craft never 
stops learning. One needs to make many pots, play many clarinet pieces, compose many 
speeches in order to master a craft, but even when has reached a high level of competence, 
one continues to refine essentially the same practice, rather than moving from one practice 
to another. That is, repetition characterises the expert as well as the novice. The successful 
public repetition of one’s craft practice is the evidence one needs to call oneself a 
craftsman. As Gregory of Nyssa puts it, if someone wants to be known as a doctor, orator or 
mathematician, he must prove it by his accomplished practise of the relevant technē. 
Similarly, he argues, those who are training people to be good Christians must produce 
people who not only seem to be Christian, but truly are – that is, who demonstrate this by 
repeated practice.36 And repeated practice continues to shape the practitioner.37 
  
 
35 Sennett, The Craftsman, 172–78. For a practical application of craft see: Christian Peterson, BBC website: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/the_extraordinary_power_of_a_lump_of_wood. Accessed 
20.02.19 (my thanks to Clare Bryden for pointing this out to me). 
36 Gregory of Nyssa, On the Christian Mode of Life (tr. V. W. Callahan, St Gregory, Ascetical Works, Washington 
DC, 82). 
37 See especially Derek Krueger, Writing and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East 
(Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 1.: the craft of (theological) writing ‘shapes’ and 
‘discipline[s]’ the ‘Christian author’; hagiography is ‘doubly generative, producing both the saints and their 
authors’ (ibid. 2).  
e. Ethical implications 
 The language we use to describe what we do matters profoundly. But, precisely for 
that reason, it needs to be subjected to critical scrutiny. The language of craft and craft-
education is no exception. Many descriptions of what we do, however, emerge as a result of 
a rhetorical distinction which defends our own ways of doing things in contrast with others. 
As I suggested earlier, the over-simplified dichotomy between lectures and conversational 
teaching is a variant on the ancient ‘bad orator, good philosopher’ motif which was itself 
used rhetorically, especially by philosophers, and which obscured the quite considerable 
similarities between rhetorical and philosophical education in the ancient world.38 Although 
I do not have the space to justify this claim fully here, my assumption is that one of these 
similarities is that rhetorical and philosophical education shared this model of learning with 
other crafts or technai. It is notable, for example, that Socrates defends a ‘the true art of 
rhetoric and persuasion’ in the Phaedrus in terms of knowledge (knowledge of the good in 
relation to one’s subject and one’s audience) and learning by imitating a living example—a 
process which takes ‘great effort’).39 One of the dangers, however, of the concept of 
‘Christian formation’ is that it sounds a very positive word; it is deliberately positioning itself 
in relation to other (more secular) alternatives: ‘formation’ is more spiritual than ‘training’; 
 
38 Another example is the claim that early Christians wrote clear, simple prose, while their pagan counterparts 
were enslaved to oratory of the Second Sophistic: again, this is an over-simplification used for rhetorical 
purposes. See Morwenna Ludlow, ‘Christian Identity and Rhetoric about Literary Style’, in Rhetoric and 
Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Richard Flower and Morwenna Ludlow, forthcoming (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2020). 
39 Phaedrus, e.g. 269d-270b-d, 271d-272b; 273e; 276a-b; 278a. 
it is less dependent on intellect than ‘learning’. But it can all too easily become contentless. 
In this lecture I have tried to give a little more content to the concept of formation, by 
suggesting that one might understand it in terms of craft-education. In the final part of my 
paper I wish to investigate some of the ethical implications of this model, particularly in 
relation to power. 
 So, what are the advantages and disadvantages of this model? Firstly, it has the 
advantage of realism. The model of learning something by imitating someone more 
experienced captures something very recognisable about learning and learners (or teaching 
and teachers). It is a model recognisable to those for whom neither formal lectures nor one-
to-one tuition have been part of their experience. It can be seen in the experience of 
learning how to mend a bicycle puncture from a brother or how perform a particular dance 
move from a school-friend. Furthermore, the idea that learning a craft takes time, effort, 
commitment can be understood by reflection on learning practices such as learning how to 
play a sport or play a musical instrument—practices which are accessible at second-hand 
even to those who are un-sporty or unmusical by learning about the experience of well-
known sportswomen or musicians. 
 Secondly, seeing formation in terms of craft-learning has the advantage of situating 
it firmly in community. An orator is one individual attempting to communicate to a number 
of others; a philosopher teaches one-to-one. Craft-learning, as many writers on the subject 
have shown, typically takes place in a workshop. Typically, several pupils are taught in the 
same workshop; a pupil may be taught different but related skills by different masters.40 
 
40 See Sennett, The Craftsman, chap. 2; Ludlow, Art, Craft and Theology, chap. 10.  
Furthermore, craft learning frequently demands a commitment not just to a particular 
workshop, but to a whole craft community. Experience is shared both within a workshop 
and between workshops; learning involves copying, adaptation and experimentation and 
these are all socially-mediated. Indeed, the learning involved in learning a craft captures 
something important about social identity: commonly, people are bound together by their 
commitment to certain practices.41 Potters commonly identify themselves as such—they are 
committed to a craft tradition, not just to the production of certain kinds of object. This is 
very noticeable in academia: academics are very often committed to the practices 
associated with higher education in general, and their discipline (history, philosophy etc.) 
functions as a guild with which they identify, beyond the bounds of their own institution. 
This is one of the reasons why a focus on outputs and targets alone frequently misfires. 
 Thirdly, however, craft-education has an interesting, but complex relationship with 
language. What is the form of discourse appropriate to the sort of formation involved in 
craft-education? This is perhaps an odd question, given that my argument above that 
modern writers discuss tacit knowledge; that the ancient sources stress learning by copying; 
that Gregory of Nyssa argues that one needs a living example rather than books. 
Nevertheless, although Gregory did assert that ‘guidance by example’ is ‘clearer than verbal 
instruction’, he also admitted that ‘there are indeed written instructions’.42 This suggests 
that there may be a discourse appropriate to craft-education, but that it will never be 
entirely adequate—it is decentred. This form of education does not labour under the 
 
41 This is theme which runs throughout Sennett, The Craftsman, chap. especially 2; Alasdair C MacIntyre, After 
Virtue a Study in Moral Theory (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), chaps 18, especially page 299-300. 
42 Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity 23.1. 
burden of trying to show that words alone are enough. It may not be coincidental that 
Gregory of Nyssa has an empathetic emphasis on the idea that human discourse (logos) is 
part of the created realm and that human language is always embodied—it requires the 
motion of sound waves in the air or scratches of a stylus on paper.43 Gregory’s apophatic 
theology is peculiarly resistant to the idea that if only one could intuit transcendent ideas 
then one would know the truth. All language is dependent on material things and therefore 
there is always the possibility of mistakes and slippage. On the other hand, this recognition 
that all language is dependent on the material opens up the possibility that, used carefully, 
it can actually be used well in teaching at craft and forming pupils.  
 Related to this theme is the idea that, as craft theorists have often argued, craft skills 
unite head, hand and heart.44 Gregory and his rhetorically-trained peers thought something 
similar about the craft of language: it unites reason and emotion, but also depends on the 
technical competence in handling a pen or using one’s voice. Orators were also taught that 
– precisely because they unite head, hand and heart – words do things. That is, in addition 
to expressing true propositions, words can command, forbid, encourage and persuade. Craft 
learning and Christian formation alike need these kinds of words. Even when words fail in 
being entirely adequate to describe how to make a pot or fit a zip, some kind of 
communication is necessary to encourage, prompt and discipline the one who is learning.
 These reflections might explain the kinds of text which early Christian writers 
produce to support Christian formation. It is rarely direct (a fact which led patristic scholars 
of earlier generations to rate it below truly theological dogmatic works). There are, it is true, 
 
43 See especially, Against Eunomius II.198-237. 
44 Sennett, The Craftsman, especially 50-52; Frayling, On Craftsmanship, 141. 
monastic rules, but a far more common genre is hagiography – that is, the creation of as 
vivid a picture of saints as possible so that they can be a living image to emulate.45 Narrative 
in general is used a great deal, as are vivid images, metaphors and similes. Preaching is 
essential and often calls the congregation to account, exhorts them to action, or comforts 
them when their energies are waning. In other words, this suggests that there is a form of 
discourse which is appropriate to Christian formation, but it is a form which decentres itself: 
it is not the most important thing in the pedagogic process. 
 Fourthly and finally, craft-learning has a complex relationship with power. In this 
there are both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the model of craft-learning 
has the potential to be more inclusive than teaching envisaged as either the transfer of 
complex information through a lecture or pedagogy through one-to-one conversation: both 
of these demand relatively advanced intellectual skills which have usually been honed in 
relatively selective educational contexts. Craft-learning also has the potential to be more 
inclusive in terms of gender and class, because, across time and space, learning a craft has 
been an activity which has been much more widespread among women and lower social 
classes than other forms of education.46 In addition, seeing formation in terms of learning a 
craft might be thought to destabilise some power-relationships which commonly hold in 
learning and teaching. Besides being more accessible as a model, the fact that craft-learning 
is based in community might have the potential to decentre the individual teacher, in 
 
45 See especially, Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian 
Discourse (Berkeley [etc.]: University of California Press, 1991), chaps 2 and 3. 
46 See e.g. the Introduction to: Glenn Adamson, The Invention of Craft (London: Victoria and Albert Museum; 
Thames and Hudson, 2013). 
comparison to the teacher’s role as lecture-giver and even to their role in Socratic dialogue 
(which, as I have already noted, can be frequently highly-directive and not a process of 
mutual learning at all).  
 Of course, one needs to recognise that in any teaching relationship there is the 
possibility of an abuse of power. There is no getting around the fact of the teacher’s greater 
experience; in craft-education she must be there to lead and discipline (not least for reasons 
of safety).47 However, as I argued above, there is an assumption in craft-education that the 
master is still also a craftsperson, a practitioner and therefore a learner: the master-potter is 
still making pots; the musician conducting the master-class still sings or plays the violin. As a 
teacher, therefore, they are still opening themselves up to the possibility of being shaped by 
their craft. If craft practice has the potential to change the practitioner, then there is a 
vulnerability and open-endedness to the process of craft-practice and of teaching that 
practice. This is particularly the case if all practitioners acknowledge Jesus Christ as their 
ultimate exemplar and teacher. The question is, then, whether a good teacher on this model 
is more open to change than Socrates’ ideal philosopher.  
 It must be admitted too that craft-learning and teaching has not and does not always 
function like this. In particular, in the era in which the early Christian authors were writing, 
many craftspeople worked in workshops with appalling conditions. There was widespread if 
not universal use of child labour and many craftspeople were slaves. For this reason, 
although Mike Higton has himself proposed that ‘all university learning takes the form of 
learning a craft – indeed, it takes the form of a craft succession’ which could usefully be 
 
47 My thanks to John de Gruchy for reminding me of this point. 
thought of as a form of apprenticeship, he ultimately shies away from this analogy, 
concerned that the ‘language of apprenticeship is deeply gendered’, not only relying on the 
notion of the ‘master’, but also conjuring up a picture of ‘paternal authority, guild hierarchy, 
and corporal punishment, which should make us deeply uncomfortable’.48 To conclude, 
then, the question which my discussion here raises most insistently—and which should be 
the focus of future discussion—is the question of what power relations are hidden in all our 
models of learning, teaching and formation. To what extent does the model of craft-
education, which decentres attempts to master knowledge through language and which 
subordinates the human teacher to Christ, resist the human abuse of power? How should it 
be developed theologically so as to strengthen that resistance? 
 
 
48 Mike Higton, A Theology of Higher Education (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 181–85. 
Quotations from pp. 181-2. 
